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Between 2002 and 2014 natural disasters caused over 
€100 billion of economic losses in the European Union 
(EU). Floods are among the most significant natural haz-
ards, with 17 of 18 EU member states reporting flood 
risk in their national risk assessments (European Com-
mission, 2014). Over the last 15 years Central European 
member states, including Austria, Czech Republic, Ger-
many, and Hungary, were hit twice (in 2002 and 2013) 
by one-hundred-year floods (Zurich, 2014). As well as 
causing damages totaling more than €30 billion, these 
two events once again demonstrated the high regional 
interdependency of flood risk in Europe. Taking into ac-
count these interdependencies across regions, together 
with climate and socioeconomic projections, we estimate 
(based on the A1B scenario) that average annual flood 
losses in Europe could increase from the current lev-
el of €4.9 billion to €23.5 billion in 2050. A comparison 
of these results with previous assessments also suggests 
that neglecting the spatial correlations between river 
basins could lead to an underestimation of continental 
flood risk, which has major implications for European dis-
aster risk financing strategies (Jongman et al., 2014). 
The 2002 Central European floods triggered an unprec-
edented political will to institutionalise financial compen-
sation for disaster-stricken EU member countries; this 
led to the establishment of the European Union Soli-
darity Fund (EUSF), an ex-post loss-financing vehicle 
for EU member states and candidate countries for use 
in cases where a disaster exceeds the government’s re-
sources to cope. Until 2014 the fund operated with an 
annual budget of €1 billion. However, the latest Multian-
nual Financial Framework (MFF 2014–2020) has halved 
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its budget to €500 million (2011 prices) and added a 
temporal risk-spreading dimension (OJ, 2013). The pri-
mary aim of the EUSF is to finance emergency operations 
undertaken by public authorities to alleviate non-insura-
ble damages. Hence, it covers only a fraction of the total 
damages: compensation has averaged about 3% of total 
direct losses since 2002. In addition, it should be noted 
that the EUSF is a ‘virtual’ fund – in the event of disaster, 
the money is raised above and beyond the normal EU 
budgeting procedure.
The EUSF compensates only non-insurable public dam-
ages; but public sector responsibility often exceeds those 
losses. Based on a cross-country sample of European 
natural disasters, Mechler et al. (2010) highlighted that 
governments, as insurers of last resort, often absorb half 
the direct damages because of their explicit and implicit 
liabilities. The post-disaster financing ability of govern-
ments varies. Based on very restrictive assumptions, Aus-
tria, for instance, is able to finance losses of up to around 
€3.9 billion, while Hungary and Romania could find it diffi-
cult to finance damages above €1.6 billion (Hochrainer et 
al., 2010). This difference in coping capacities is reflected 
in part in the differentiated intervention threshold of the 
EUSF, which, in most cases, is calculated on the basis of 
gross national income. 
There have been on-going discussions within the EU 
concerning disaster risk financing in general and disas-
ter insurance in particular (European Commission, 2013, 
2015a). Experts argue that there are cases where the 
European NatCat insurance markets do not seem able 
to fully cope with existing risks (Maccaferri et al., 2012). 
“ Re-orienting the EUSF from a post-disaster 
response and aid instrument to a pre-disaster, 
risk-based solidarity instrument.”
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Some of the policy discussions are thus seeking to as-
certain how great the need is for action to enhance dis-
aster insurance penetration at the EU level. In general, 
the discussions aim to contribute to a more disaster-re-
silient European Union; most importantly, they include 
disaster risk reduction (DRR) as an overarching aim in the 
field of disaster risk management (DRM). Over the years, 
although disaster risk management considerations 
have been reflected in a number of key policies, the 
EUSF is still the only dedicated EU-wide disaster risk 
financing instrument. 
This chapter investigates the Fund and assesses its per-
formance as well as aims to identify alternative policy 
options to further enhance the financial resilience of the 
EU with respect to natural disasters. As the EUSF was es-
sentially created to assist governments, we will also take a 
closer look at one highly flood-prone country, Romania, 
in order to gain a better insight into how the advanced 
operating systems already in place could be enhanced. 
The investigation focuses on the key stakeholders and 
their perceptions regarding the limitations of current op-
erating systems and how these could be addressed by, 
inter alia, the EUSF. Romania is a natural choice, as floods 
are a devastating phenomenon there. The country has 
suffered from frequent flood-related disasters as well as 
major associated economic losses. Over one million hec-
tares (ha) of land are exposed to flooding; nearly one mil-
lion Romanians live in high flood risk areas; and over 900 
communities in the country are situated in high flood risk 
areas (Romanian Waters National Administration 2013). 
Table 13.1 indicates the total losses, damage, and EUSF 
funding for major events in 2005, 2008, 2010, and 2014. 
Occurrence Nature of disaster Category Damage(million €)
Aid granted
(million €)
Total aid 
granted
(million €)
April 2005 spring floods major 489 18.8
July 2005 summer floods major 1.050 52.4
July 2008 floods regional 471 11.8
June 2010 floods major 876 25.0
April 2014 spring floods
neighboring 
country 168 4.2
July 2014 summer floods regional 172 4.3 116.5
Table 13.1. 
Major flood losses and EUSF interventions since 2002 for Roma-
nia (Source: European Commission, 2015b).
254 Flood risk: the EUSF and Romania
Disaster risk financing in Romania relies strongly on ex-
post financing instruments, such as the government’s In-
tervention Fund, budget reallocation, donor assistance, 
and domestic and/or external credit and aid granted by 
the EUSF. It also has ex-ante instruments in operation. 
Among the most important are mandatory and option-
al property insurance schemes. The financial protec-
tion against damage from natural catastrophes is thus 
achieved by a mix of compulsory and optional insur-
ance and state intervention.
In line with the main objectives of the ENHANCE project 
(see chapter 1), this chapter focuses on two multi-sec-
tor partnerships (MSPs):
(1) At the EU level, where the only dedicated disaster risk 
financing instrument is the EUSF, we assess the options 
and benefits of formulating an EU-wide MSP to enhance 
pan-European disaster resilience. 
(2) In the context of Romania we focus our attention on 
an existing partnership between the public and pri-
vate sectors. 
The assessment is based on various methods, including 
state-of-the-art quantitative risk analysis, multi-criteria 
assessment, stakeholder workshops, and a large-scale 
survey. With respect to specific risk management and ad-
aptation strategies to increase the resilience of different 
stakeholders or risk bearers, we distinguish between dif-
ferent scales and include possible dependencies among 
them via the EUSF mechanism.
Photo by Baloncici/Shutterstock.
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For a risk-based assessment of the EUSF and multi-sec-
tor partnerships, the first priority is a comprehensive, 
continental flood risk analysis, including the compar-
ison of different adaptation options (Table 13.2; see 
chapter 2 for the methods used here). As the EUSF op-
erates on the pan-European level, one major outcome 
of our assessment is the importance of taking river 
basin dependencies across countries explicitly into 
account in order to avoid the severe underestimation 
of continental flood risk, especially for extreme events 
(Jongman et al., 2014). At the same time, the analysis 
A risk-based assessment 
of current policies 
Options Year Uninsured 
loss (billion €)
Insurance claims
(billion €)
EUSF claims
(billion €)
Additional 
investment  
in DRR
(billion €)
BAU
2013 4.48 1.89 0.35 0.0
2050 17.55 4.64 1.29 0.0
50% insurance penetration
2013 2.86 3.51 0.35 0.0
2050 10.45 11.74 1.29 0.0
100% insurance 
penetration
2013 0.00 6.45 0.00 0.0
2050 0.00 22.28 0.00 0.0
Min 1/100 protection 
standards
2013 3.17 1.34 0.25 0.49
2050 12.42 3.28 0.92 1.72
Min 1/300 protection 
standards
2013 1.00 0.42 0.08 1.24
2050 3.92 1.04 0.29 4.56
demonstrates that the increasing risk could be man-
ageable using a combination of various disaster risk 
management options, such as risk reduction and in-
surance instruments (Jongman et al., 2014). For exam-
ple, raising the flood protection standards in all basins 
to a minimum of 1 per 100 years could decrease the 
total expected annual flood losses by around €7 billion 
(close to 30%) by 2050. Increasing insurance penetra-
tion, on the other hand, does not itself reduce risk but 
rather reallocates the financial burden across public 
and private stakeholders (Table 13.2).
Table 13.2. 
Continental flood risk assessment considering various risk management options 
(Source: Based on Jongman et al., 2014; Supplementary Section).
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As already indicated, under the business-as-usual (BAU) 
scenario, increasing losses will put high pressure on the 
fund. Table 13.2 shows that the average annual payments 
from the Fund can increase from the current level of €350 
million to €1.29 billion. Compared to the old EUSF budget, 
this equates to 9% of annual probability of depletion (on 
average, once in every 11 years) by 2050. Because of its 
additional temporal risk-spreading dimension, the new 
budget structure increases the Fund’s robustness, but 
only marginally so (Hochrainer-Stigler et al., 2015). 
Based on a detailed assessment of the EUSF applications, 
a third important finding is that despite its name, the 
Solidarity Fund does not necessarily show solidarity 
among member states. Hochrainer-Stigler et al. (2015) 
demonstrated that the Fund allocates significantly more 
aid as a percentage of eligible costs to those countries 
that are most able to withstand the financial impact of 
disasters. Thus, if solidarity is defined as a needs-based 
concept, the Fund’s performance is questionable. On the 
other hand, an investigation of 25 EUSF interventions in 
the five-year period from 2008 to 2013 suggests that, in 
most cases, less wealthy new member states have been 
net gainers from the Fund. This means that countries 
less able to cope with the economic consequences of 
disasters have generally contributed less to the pool in 
relation to their expected losses than those with higher 
coping capacity. This can be seen as a form of contribu-
tion-based solidarity, similar to an insurance pool with 
cross-subsidised premiums. However, it should still be 
noted that contribution-based solidarity stands in stark 
contrast to needs-based solidarity, where aid is awarded 
to countries based on their ability to cope and irrespec-
tive of their contribution.
As well as the funding issues and possible MSPs for re-
ducing current and future risk at the pan-European level, 
another important dimension includes perceptions at 
the national level. The EUSF as an ex-post fund may 
encourage EU governments to take fewer prevention 
measures, as they do not bear the full cost of this be-
havior (often referred to as moral hazard). The recent 
reforms of the Fund address this issue, actively encour-
aging member states to implement disaster prevention 
and risk management strategies via a requirement to 
report before and after applications. The European Com-
mission can even reduce or refuse a grant if a member 
state repeatedly breaches its obligation to implement EU 
law regarding preventive measures (OJ, 2014). In practical 
terms, the latter mainly concerns flood risk and, at least 
in theory, makes EUSF aid conditional on the implemen-
tation of the Floods Directive. The results in the Table 2 
above were used in a key stakeholder workshop in Brus-
sels which discussed the feasibility of possible schemes 
to be implemented in the future. At the workshop, rele-
vant Romanian ministries also shared their experience. 
This is discussed next. 
Generally speaking, in Romania the insurance industry 
has developed considerably since the fall of Communism 
in 1989. At first, insurance density was very low (Petres-
cu, 2009). Today, however, the supply of insurance is di-
versified and the insurance sector is fully integrated into 
the world wide insurance industry. There are currently 36 
insurance companies operating in Romania, with all the 
largest companies represented. The potential of the in-
surance market in Romania is recognised as high, not least 
due to the large size of the country and the large number 
of people and properties at risk. However, real demand 
is quite low, and the financial crises have depressed de-
mand still further. Moreover, insurance demand is not 
spatially uniform but concentrated in geographical areas 
of high economic potential and above-average incomes. 
Thus, the largest insurance premiums were underwritten 
in 2014 in the Bucharest area, that is, around 49.88% of 
the national total (ASF, 2015).
Insurance in Romania has some unique characteristics. 
It takes the form of an already established multi-sec-
tor partnership. Law 260/2008 regarding mandatory 
home insurance created a public-private partnership 
– linking home owners, insurance companies, and local 
and central authorities. Its role was to manage financial 
risk associated with floods, landslides, and earthquakes 
through insurance (Parliament of Romania, 2008). In No-
vember 2009, twelve insurance companies came togeth-
er to form the Insurance Pool against Natural Disasters 
(PAID). According to Law 260/2008, homeowners must 
insure their buildings against three natural risks: flood, 
earthquake, and landslides. Homeowners without man-
datory home insurance are subject to a fine which is col-
lected by the local public authorities. As discovered dur-
ing workshops in Bucharest, the local public authorities 
play an important role not only in the prevention of risks 
but also when disasters occur (evacuation, shelter etc.).
As indicated, the law was intended to be a mechanism 
for collaboration between the public authority, the pri-
vate insurance industry, and homeowners, and thereby 
to incentivise risk reduction for households, given that 
the government was no longer legally bound to provide 
financial compensation to homeowners to rebuild their 
properties after flood-, earthquake-, and landslide-relat-
ed disasters. The greatest added value of this mechanism 
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is seen as the prevention of financial risk related to natu-
ral catastrophes. 
However, the insurance mechanism has been debated 
heavily over time, and several changes have been made 
to the legislation on mandatory home insurance. Law 
243/2013 was promulgated to modify and complete Law 
260/2008. Under it, other insurance companies were au-
thorised to supply optional insurance for catastrophic 
risks and signed cooperation protocols with PAID to close 
mandatory home insurance contracts (Parliament of Ro-
mania, 2013). The first mandatory policy on home insur-
ance was issued in July 2010. At the end of 2010, there 
were 2,132,778 optional home insurance contracts, and 
367,287 mandatory contracts related to 8.3 million pri-
vately owned homes in Romania (4.5 million in urban and 
3.8 million in rural areas) (ASF, 2015). In 2011, the highest 
number of optional home insurance contracts 4,747,280 
(and 574,229 mandatory) was written, amounting to a 
63% insurance coverage of homes in Romania. In 2014, 
the number of optional home insurance contracts de-
creased to 2,057,208 and the number of mandatory 
home insurance contracts increased to 1,491,329 (see 
Figure 13.1).
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The analytical methods and tools applied to study the 
risk and performance of the MSP were both qualitative 
and quantitative; they included semi-directed interviews, 
workshops, and large-scale surveys. Workshops and 
semi-directed interviews were conducted in 2014 among 
insurance companies, public authorities, including the 
ministry of finance, flood and water management officials 
from the ministry of the environment, and specialists in 
the environment and insurance. Additionally, in May 2015 
a large-scale survey of homeowners and insurance 
companies was conducted. Because of space restric-
tions, we focus here not on details but on key results. The 
survey aimed to focus on the perception of i) natural dis-
aster risks and ii) the main instruments for recovery 
and risk protection in specific households. We studied 
the general perception of mandatory home insurance 
and the main factors influencing it. We were also interest-
ed in the perception of the insurance premium, the sum 
insured, and the quality of the relationship between the 
stakeholders – the population, the public authority, and 
the insurance companies– and, last but not least, the per-
ception of the usefulness and mechanism of the EUSF. In 
total, 461 households were interviewed, as well as 117 
respondents from insurance companies and brokers. 
Figure 13.1.
Evolution of the number of optional and mandatory home insur-
ance contracts 2010-2014 (Source: ASF 2015 data).
ENHANCE Workshop in Bucharest, Romania, October 2014.
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Summarising the findings from the survey, in the opin-
ion of both home owners and insurers, earthquakes and 
floods were perceived as the most dangerous events. 
The local authorities have the main role in fighting nat-
ural catastrophes; however, the central authority, the in-
surance companies, the population, and the EUSF were 
also perceived as important in the prevention of natural 
catastrophes and recovery following them. As far as pre-
paredness to deal with natural disasters is concerned, 
homeowners consider EU institutions to be better pre-
pared, while insurance companies and brokers consider 
insurers to have higher preparedness. Conversely, re-
spondents considered the population and the local/cen-
tral authorities to have low preparedness.
The perception of the natural disaster-related activity of 
insurance companies in Romania is favorable; the man-
datory home insurance is perceived as necessary, but not 
sufficient, for protection against natural disasters. Insur-
ers have a more positive view regarding mandatory home 
insurance and the relationships between the stakehold-
ers. Mandatory home insurance has limited coverage 
(and was seen as insufficient for covering risk). This has 
generated the need for optional insurance to include ad-
ditional risk. In the case of mandatory home insurance, 
the insurance premiums in the sample are perceived as 
being moderate, but in the opinion of homeowners they 
are still rather expensive. The main reason for homeown-
ers not having mandatory home insurance was ‘not hav-
ing enough money’ (53.15% of total). Other reasons for 
not buying mandatory home insurance included i) a lack 
of understanding of the necessity of mandatory home 
insurance and ii) lack of information about mandatory 
home insurance. 
The EUSF is considered by 87.9% of homeowners and 
90.6% of respondents from insurance companies and 
brokers as an efficient tool in recovery after natural ca-
tastrophes. It is also perceived as vital for post-disaster 
recovery for the member countries of the EU by 75.7% 
of the population and 72.6% of insurance specialists – a 
very positive view of the EUSF. We also asked for best 
ways forward. In that regard, the majority of respond-
ents thought that the EUSF should be reoriented to 
incentivise prevention. The respondents emphasised 
that the EUSF should allocate funds for consolidation of 
buildings, dam infrastructure, riverbeds, and reforesta-
tion (87.2% of homeowners, 81.2% of insurers and bro-
kers). Additionally, 61.8% of homeowners and 58.1% of 
insurance-sector respondents indicated that the EUSF 
should be oriented toward prevention through the al-
location of funds for insurance/reinsurance purposes. 
Given the nearly same perspectives on some aspects 
of the EUSF at both the pan-European level and the lo-
cal level (at least for Romania), a workshop in Brussels 
was coordinated to discuss and evaluate promising new 
steps forward to enhance resilience through new mul-
ti-sector partnerships.
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The quantitative assessments outlined above suggest a 
combination of various risk management instruments 
at the European and national levels, including the EUSF, 
risk reduction, and insurance, that can eventually create 
significant benefits (Table 13.2). However, a quantitative 
assessment like this falls short in that it does not take 
into account important qualitative aspects, such as po-
litical and institutional feasibility considerations. We thus 
combined the quantitative analysis with a more nuanced 
approach that takes explicitly into account the views and 
preferences of key stakeholder groups. In so doing, we 
applied a state-of-the-art multi-criteria approach 
within a workshop setting involving stakeholders from 
the public and private sector, and from the non-govern-
mental and research communities. We now discuss the 
outcomes. Again, due to space limitations only an over-
view can be provided. We refer to chapters 2, 3, and 5 
for more information (see also Hochrainer-Stigler and 
Lorant, in progress). 
The framework of our multi-criteria analysis builds on 
the work described in Chapter 5 and a previous study 
by Bräuninger et al. (2011) which assessed risk financing 
options for Europe based on a set of criteria and indica-
tors; this was adapted for our assessment (Figure 13.2). 
Economic efficiency covers the cost implications of op-
erationalising and running the instrument. Equity relates 
to how strongly the instrument promotes solidarity and 
creates inequities (winners and losers). Feasibility relates 
to the the instrument’s consistency with other policy in-
struments and the regulatory environment, and its ac-
ceptability to the key interest groups. Unlike Bräuninger 
et al. (2011), we introduced the promotion of disaster risk 
Policy recommendations
reduction as a separate criterion. Based on these criteria 
and the related indicators, a set of questions was devel-
oped and pre-tested in a number of test runs in order to 
determine further questions and to test the clarity and 
adequacy of the proposed questions .
Based on the results of the quantitative assessment dis-
cussed in section 2 above, a risk layer approach (see 
Mechler et al. 2014) was adopted during the workshop 
to identify three different options for multi-stakeholder 
partnerships:
• Option 1: eliminate the upper limit of the Fund, 
which is currently €500 million annually (with option-
al borrowing from previous/subsequent years) with 
the aim of responding to all qualifying disasters. 
• Option 2: further strengthen the link between the 
EUSF and disaster risk reduction contributions to the 
Fund not only to take into account the economic per-
formance of member states but also the risk reduc-
tion measures implemented by the country. 
• Option 3: completely or partially transform the EUSF 
into a pre-disaster instrument that supports (rein-
sures) a national (public/private) insurance system 
with more affordable premiums and higher disaster 
insurance penetration in the EU (less dependence 
on post-disaster government assistance).
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Enhancing DRM
Objective Criteria Indicators
Cost of implementation
Cost of administration
Solidarity
Decrease inequities
Promotion of DRR
Regulatory feasibility
Support from EU MS
Support from insurers
Overall feasibility
Economic Efficiency
Equity
DRR
Institutional/Political
Feasibility
A new state-of-the-art multi-criteria tool (the Preference 
Decision Wizard based on the CAR method) (Daniel-
son & Ekenberg, 2015) was used for the evaluation. It 
enables information and evaluations to be handled in an 
automated way. Details of the analysis can be found in 
the ENHANCE Deliverable 7.4 and Hochrainer-Stigler and 
Lorant (in progress); here we give only a brief overview of 
the results. 
From a policy-making point of view, choosing the op-
tion with the highest overall satisfaction rate across the 
groups does not necessarily lead to the most appropriate 
outcome, as one should also consider how satisfaction 
is distributed among different stakeholders. In general, 
a more evenly distributed satisfaction level can increase 
acceptability across the board. Our analysis revealed that 
stakeholders as a whole considered the link between 
disaster risk reduction and the EUSF (Option 2) as most 
satisfying in terms of the four criteria described above 
(see Figure 13.2). Nevertheless, it should be noted that 
the most radical option (Option 3) – the complete trans-
formation of the EUSF – also showed similar satisfaction 
levels and had the additional benefit of more evenly dis-
tributed satisfaction levels across different stakeholders. 
Option 1 performed worst compared to the other two 
options. Next we present some policy recommendations.
As indicated, we have chosen three risk instruments as 
the focal point for our assessment of MSPs, namely, the 
EUSF, insurance, and risk reduction. As the quantitative 
analysis shows, the combination of these instruments 
can create significant additional benefits, including in-
creased robustness and decrease in overall risk, as well 
as various co-benefits. However, the workshops in Brus-
sels and in Romania have revealed that various bound-
aries of an institutional, political, or efficiency-related 
nature need to be overcome. We thus stress some nec-
essary conditions for possible MSPs on the pan-Eu-
ropean level and how they could be linked with the 
country and household level: First, any strategy for up-
coming successful MSPs has to recognise that there is 
no ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach from the European to the 
individual member state level. In other words, a flexible 
European framework is required that allows member 
states to develop and implement tailor-made strategies. 
Secondly, there is a need to precisely define responsi-
Figure 13.2. 
Criteria and indicators for assessment of options.
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bilities in terms of disaster risk reduction and risk financ-
ing of stakeholders at different policy levels (from local to 
regional to national). Thirdly, prevention measures to 
reduce risk need to be supported in the long run and 
not switched away (as in the past) due to non-disaster 
risk related circumstances. Fourthly, communication 
about risk financing measures and their costs and 
benefits is essential for understanding, valuing, and ac-
cepting MSPs.
We further found that the explicit incorporation of 
risk due to natural disasters within the government 
budget (and planning process) is very likely a key aspect 
for any successful MSP to enhance the resilience of its 
society to catastrophic natural hazard impacts. It has al-
ready been noted in other publications (see IPCC 2012; 
and more recently Mechler & Hochrainer-Stigler, 2014) 
that a substantial risk of unaccounted-for disasters (also 
called a hidden disaster deficit) coupled with weak fiscal 
conditions can lead to major additional stress on the fis-
cal position and eventually to reduced fiscal space for 
public finances to fund other public investment projects. 
Liabilities DirectObligation in any event
Contingent
Obligation if a particular event occurs
Explicit
Government liability
recognised by law or
Contract
Foreign and domestic sovereign 
borrowing, expenditures by budget 
law and budget expenditures
State guarantees for non-sovereign 
borrowing and public and private sector 
entities, reconstruction of public 
infrastructure
Implicit
A ‘moral’ obligation
of the government
Future recurrent costs of public invest-
ment projects, pension and health care 
expenditure
Default of subnational government or 
public or private entities, disaster relief
It was therefore suggested that to reduce fiscal vulnera-
bility, ex-ante risk management and financing measures 
can be taken, such as implementing risk prevention, of-
fering state-sponsored insurance to households, or en-
gaging in sovereign risk financing measures. It is impor-
tant to note that, conceptually, this array of measures 
transforms the contingent disaster liability into a direct 
liability which could be paid for with, for example, certain 
annual premiums, fund outlays, and debt service pay-
ments. Such options can help to move some disaster risk 
liabilities to regular budget practice and could lead to, on 
the one hand, improved accountability and, on the other 
hand, clear incentives for risk reduction (being specifical-
ly accounted for in the budget balance sheet promotes 
the implementation of such measures). However, as in-
dicated, to transform a contingent state of disaster risk 
into a certain one, a probabilistic approach using an es-
timate of risk is necessary. The following simplistic vis-
ualisation of a government balance sheet can serve as 
a basis for planning and for inclusion of contingent risk 
(Table 13.3; see Mechler & Hochrainer-Stigler, 2014 for 
further discussion).
Table 13.3. 
Government liabilities and disaster risk (Source: Based on 
Mechler and Hochrainer-Stigler, 2014).
Photo by Petrescu Ștefan (2008), Romania. O perspectivă 
aeriană (Romania. A Bird’s eye View), Uranus: Bucharest.
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In principle, this approach could be also implemented at 
the pan-European scale. The Committee on Regional De-
velopment of the European Parliament indicated that the 
rationale for financing the EUSF outside of the EU budget 
is that it is impossible to know in advance how much will 
be drawn from the Fund in the course of the year (Eu-
ropean Parliament, 2012). However, this is not the case, 
given that estimates of risk are now available, and explicit 
incorporation of risk should be possible at the pan-Euro-
pean and the country level. Incorporating these disasters 
into the budget planning process also provides an oppor-
tunity to estimate the benefits of risk reduction in mon-
etary terms, for example, through reduction in annual 
average losses, etc. As we have seen via the quantitative 
modeling approach applied at the pan-European level, 
risk reduction could also have many benefits in terms or 
reduction of the individual risk of MSPs, for example, an 
increase in robustness of the EUSF and a decrease in the 
capital needs of insurers.  
Based on the expert judgments presented during the 
workshops, we can conclude that increasing the size of 
the EUSF (Option 1) is the least feasible option at the 
moment. On the other hand, creating a stronger link 
between the Fund and risk reduction, or the complete 
transformation of the Fund to an MSP (namely, a more 
radical option) are both considered good options and re-
garded as satisfactory for many stakeholder groups. If, as 
suggested, risk is explicitly budgeted for, then risk reduc-
tion investments could, at least partially, be financed via 
the insurance sector. Moreover, part of this decrease in 
risk can also easily be transferred to decrease premiums. 
As seen in the case of Romania, money from the EUSF 
fund can only be used to repair damaged infrastructure 
up to the level before the disaster occurred, that is, it can-
not be used directly for risk reduction. If the government 
includes in a part of its budget a contingent for disaster 
appearing, it could use this money to build back better 
and the EUSF to restore assets to the original state (a 
major point within the Sendai Framework for Disaster 
Risk Reduction 2015-2030). Hence, a direct link between 
the EUSF, government risk, risk reduction, and insurance 
can be made if the risk is explicitly accounted for in the 
government budget. 
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